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I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs have recently unearthed the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA") in order to sue corporations for torts committed against
aliens that violate "the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."' Most recent scholarship under the ATCA has focused on
positively delineating the contours of possible claims in light of
history and the norms of international law.2 In this Article, we take a
different, more normative approach-one that analyzes the doctrine
in light of emerging principles of corporate social responsibility.
The ATCA is a potentially powerful tool for foreign plaintiffs to
challenge the conduct of large, mostly U.S.-based corporations in
* Senior Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law.
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. We would like
to thank the Searle Center on Regulation at Northwestern for support for the
research for this article.
1. Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
2. A great deal of the scholarship is devoted either to the inquiry into what
claims are or are not permissible under the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), see, e.g., Teddy Nemeroff, Note, Untying
the Khulumani Knot: Corporate Aiding andAbetting Liability Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act After Sosa, 40 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 231 (2008), or to the
historical question of the original understanding or meaning of the ATCA, see, e.g.,
Jordan J. Paust, The History, Nature, and Reach of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16
FLA. J. INT'L L. 249 (2004).
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federal court. Such alleged conduct ranges from torture to genocide
to unauthorized medical experimentation to wholesale environmental
destruction.3 In response, corporate defendants and some scholars
have argued for strictly limiting actionable claims, while other
scholars have argued for a nearly universal jurisdiction, with fewer
procedural safeguards, to try human rights and environmental abuses
in U.S. courts.4
However, when seen in light of principles of corporate social
responsibility, or CSR, neither of these extreme positions appears
tenable. CSR involves both substantive pledges to ethical behavior
as well as procedural calls for greater corporate transparency.5 As to
the substantive issues, a too-narrow interpretation of the ATCA
undermines CSR in several ways. Suits under the Act can generate
publicity regarding corporate activities that are contrary to the
corporation's public commitments. The imposition of liability by
settlement or judgment, even if it happens in only relatively few
cases, may also provide a strong financial incentive for corporations
to prevent future liability. As to the procedural issues, ATCA suits
may also lead to the discovery of new information not publicly
known, effectively policing corporate pledges to transparency.
Equally important is the danger that a too-broad interpretation of
the ATCA might itself undermine CSR. If, as some critics claim,
plaintiffs may bring ATCA suits for essentially routine natural
resource extraction operations in a foreign nation, then the ATCA
will not provide any incentive for corporations to meet their stated
CSR goals. From a CSR perspective, the ideal ATCA legal
framework would-via both the imposition of adverse publicity and
3. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
4. The sharply divergent positions on the ATCA track differences in views as
to the role of international law and especially customary international law in the
federal common law. Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARV. L. REv. 815, 831-34 (1997) (arguing for no role for customary international
law), with Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing:
International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 463
(1999).
5. See infra Part 11.2.
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liability and their non-imposition-reward relatively "good"
corporate actors and punish relatively "bad" ones.6
In light of these concerns, we explore three obstacles to using the
ATCA to encourage CSR, each of which relates to a very active legal
debate. The first obstacle relates to what kinds of wrongdoing the
ATCA makes actionable. The Supreme Court of the United States
has held that wrongful acts under the ATCA are not limited to what
would have been a violation of the law of nations in the late
eighteenth-century. However, the Court also warned courts to be
cautious when extending the reach of new claims, and held that any
new claims would have to be defined with a "specificity comparable
to" the "features" of the eighteenth-century paradigms.8 The
difficulty, from a CSR perspective, is that this ahistorical and
incoherent formulation is stifles the development of the "law of
nations" in U.S. courts by giving those courts virtually unfettered
discretion to decline jurisdiction. This is especially true in
environmental cases, where courts have been extremely reluctant to
allow ATCA suits to proceed.9
Even if such suits could proceed in theory, there are additional
obstacles to actually holding corporations liable. Corporations often
act in concert or in some coordination with local government actors,
and often it is the local government actor that is directly involved in
the alleged wrongdoing. In such cases, U.S. courts are split over
when the corporation may be held liable for aiding and abetting.' 0
Some require purposive action and planned wrongdoing. Others
6. An analogous argument has been made in favor of requiring some wrongful
intent as a precondition for the imposition of corporate criminal liability under
federal environmental laws, rather than employing an essentially strict liability
standard even in the criminal context, as some commentators advocate and as some
courts appear to accept. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of
Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental
Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407 (1995) (arguing for the integration of traditional
criminal mens rea requirements with federal environmental law).
7. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25.
8. Id. at 724.
9. For discussions of the treatment of environmental claims under the ATCA,
see Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under the A TCA as a Proxy for
Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2003); Pamela Stephens,
Applying Human Rights Norms to Climate Change: An Elusive Remedy, 21 COLO.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 49 (2010).
10. See infra Part IV.
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require a lesser showing of corporate knowledge. And some
prominent commentators and business groups argue that the ATCA
does not allow for any aiding and abetting liability at all.1'
We argue that the courts have broad discretion in fashioning an
aiding and abetting standard, and that the historical and normative
arguments against any aiding and abetting liability at all are weak.
From a CSR perspective, a purposive action or planned wrongdoing
requirement has considerable appeal. That standard would allow a
range of cases of alleged wrongdoing to proceed to the discovery
stage, while distinguishing between relatively "good" and relatively
"bad" corporate behavior.
The third obstacle relates to the state action requirement for ATCA
liability. According to some courts, any ATCA claim must involve
alleged wrongdoing by foreign state actors unless the alleged
wrongdoing fits into a very narrow category of behavior (most
notably, genocide).12 Some courts, too, require that the foreign state
actors themselves acted knowingly or purposively.13  This
requirement has the potential to prevent the ultimate imposition of
liability upon any corporate actors who benefitted from state action,
because proof of what the state actors knew or intended is often
impossible to obtain.14
11. Indeed, some go even further and argue that the ATCA creates no liability
for corporations or no liability for anyone for acts committed outside the United
States. See, e.g., Brief for Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational
Foundation as Amici Curiae Support of Petitioner, Pfizer, Inc. v. Abdullahi, 130
S.Ct. 534 (2009).
12. See infra Part IV.1.
13. See infra Part IV.1.
14. Federal law-including the rules of procedure-make it possible to
subpoena records and witnesses located within the United States. FED. R. CIV. P.
45. Successfully executing a subpoena in a foreign country, by contrast, depends
on the legal agreements between the United States and the foreign country and the
foreign country's substantive law, and is notoriously difficult, even regarding those
foreign countries that have laws and a legal system that are relatively similar to that
of the United States. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f); THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL Title 9 §279, available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia readingroom/usam/title9/crmOO279.htm;
U.S. Dep't of State, Service of Legal Documents Abroad,
http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_680.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2010).
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Endorsing the approach recently embraced by the Second Circuit,
we argue that the state action requirement should be construed in a
modest fashion, allowing suits to proceed where state actors had only
passive or no involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.' 5  This
approach not only is desirable from a CSR perspective but also heeds
the U.S. Supreme Court's warning that ATCA liability should not
unduly implicate the U.S. courts in issues of foreign relations and
-16international politics.
In sum, we argue that, from a CSR perspective, it would be helpful
for the substantive scope of wrongdoing under the ATCA to include
at least the most extreme forms of endangerment of human health and
the environment through environmental contamination or
degradation. In addition, it would be helpful for a low, but
significant, threshold to be broadly recognized for corporate aiding
and abetting liability, and for the state action requirement to be
minimized or de facto discarded. The ATCA is often regarded as a
"human rights statute." 7  While there may not be a robust
internationally recognized right to a healthy environment as such,' 8
international conventions and basic intuition suggest that death and
devastation from environmental degradation are matters of basic
human rights. Establishing a legal framework under which such
actions may lead to liability would go a long way toward promoting
international corporate CSR.
15. See infra Part IV.3.
16. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004).
17. See, e.g., Martha Lovejoy, Note, From Aiding Pirates to Aiding Human
Rights Abusers: Translating the Eighteenth-Century Paradigm of the Law of
Nations for the Alien Tort Statute, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 241, 245
(2009).
18. A general right to a healthy environment is, however, enshrined in such
documents as the Organization of African Unity: Banjul Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights art. 24, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, and The Additional Protocol
to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights art. 11(1), Nov. 14, 1998, 28 I.L.M. 161. It also appears in the
Stockholm Declaration, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416, and the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, June 14, 1992. 31 I.L.M. 874.
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II. A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE ATCA
1. History and Contours of the Statute
The ATCA is a deceptively simple statute. It reads in its entirety:
"[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."1 9 As the Supreme Court
observed in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the ATCA is a "legal
Lohengrin," and "no one seems to know whence it came." 20 Indeed,
"[t]here is no record of congressional discussion about private actions
that might be subject to the jurisdictional provision, or about any
need for further legislation to create private remedies; there is no
record even of debate on the section." 21  Even today, "despite
considerable scholarly attention, it is fair to say that a consensus
understanding of what Congress intended has proven elusive." 22
Bereft of legislative history or much interpretive case law, the
ATCA lay largely dormant until 1980, when in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, the Second Circuit upheld federal jurisdiction over a claim that
Americo Norberto Pena-Irala tortured and killed 17-year old Joelito
23Filartiga in retaliation for Filartiga's father's political activities.
The fact that both perpetrator and victim were citizens of Paraguay,
and the alleged torture occurred in Paraguay, did not dissuade the
Second Circuit from asserting jurisdiction under the ATCA.24 The
Court held that:
In light of the universal condemnation of torture in
numerous international agreements, and the renunciation of
torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually all of
the nations of the world (in principle if not in practice), we
find that an act of torture committed by a state official
against one held in detention violates established norms of
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
20. 542 U.S. at 712 (quoting IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir.
1975)).
21. Id. at 718.
22. Id. at 718-19.
23. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
24. Id. at 885.
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the international law of human rights, and hence the law of
nations.25
The Court noted that "[t]he law of nations 'may be ascertained by
consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or
by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law."' 26 Citing numerous documents
such as the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, the Court
had no trouble concluding that torture violated the law of nations.27
The question, after Filartiga, has been the extent to which other
"established norms" of international law rise to the level of the "law
of nations" sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction under the ATCA.
For years, Courts were divided as to whether evolving norms of
customary international law could count, or whether the "law of
nations" should be interpreted as including only those international
law offenses cognizable at the time of the statute's passage-most
notably those offenses described in Blackstone's Commentaries
(violation of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors,
and piracy). 2 8 In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, for example,
Judge Edwards argued that "it seems clear beyond cavil that
violations of the 'law of nations' under section 1350 are not limited
to Blackstone's enumerated offenses," 29 while Judge Bork argued
just the opposite: that Congress, in referring to the "law of nations,"
had in mind only the offenses described in Blackstone. 30
In Sosa, the Supreme Court endorsed a cautious, and muddled,
middle-ground. At the same time as the Court held that the ATCA
was "a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action," it also
25. Id. at 880.
26. Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)).
27. Id. at 881-82.
28. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715, 732 (2004); Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
29. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 789.
30. Id. at 813-14. For a response to Judge Bork's "originalist" interpretation,
see William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response
to the "Originalists, " 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221, 238 (1996) ("Not
only did the members of the First Congress understand that the law of nations had
evolved, they expected that evolution to continue - indeed, they specifically
provided for it.").
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held that "the common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law violations with a potential for
personal liability at the time." 31 These international law violations
would not be limited to the three primary offenses described by
Blackstone, but those offenses would provide some limit to what was
actionable. 32 According to the Sosa court, "courts should require any
claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms" of violation of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy. "3 In other words, while evolving norms of
international law could constitute the "law of nations" for ATCA
purposes, such norms would have to be "defined with a specificity
comparable to" the three paradigm cases described by Blackstone. 34
What exactly this compromise standard requires is less-than-clear,
and its ambiguity has allowed scholars and commentators to offer
widely divergent views on which norms are actionable and which are
not.35 The contour of this debate as it relates to environmental claims
is taken up in Part II. 2. This debate has largely taken the form of a
positive, doctrinal discussion concerning what offenses do or do not
violate the "law of nations" based on the degree of specificity and
universality of the norm at issue. What is missing from this analysis
is any normative focus. What should the "law of nations" look like?
The current ambiguity and fluidity of the doctrine makes this a prime
moment to ask-and begin to answer-this question.
2. The Corporate Focus
The myopic focus on positively delineating the contours of the
doctrine has led many scholars to ignore how the ATCA is actually
used. Much of the current focus of ATCA litigation is on multi-
national corporations' activities in developing countries. ATCA
claims have been brought over allegations that corporations aided and
abetted genocide by hiring and supervising members of the army to
31. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 724-25.
34. Id. at 732.
35. See Nemeroff, supra note 2; Paust, supra note 2.
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protect a natural gas pipeline, 36 aided and abetted human rights
abuses in the course of constructing an oil pipeline,37 conducted
unauthorized medical experimentations on children, leading to
numerous deaths,38 and aided and abetted human rights abuses by the
Government of the Sudan related to the development of oil
concessions. 39
Such ATCA litigation directly implicates corporate behavior in
regimes-such as developing countries-where local restraints on
such behavior are both minimal and easily malleable.40 In Nigeria,
for example, the Petroleum Act-the primary law governing
Nigeria's oil industry-contains vague requirements that oil
companies' actions must be conducted in accordance with "good oil
field practice."41 It is perhaps no surprise to find well-documented
environmental and human rights abuses in connection with Nigerian
oil development.42  Even when there are more stringent standards,
Nigerian state agencies have failed to adhere to them, and "[d]espite
the glaring presence of oil pollution, there is yet to be any
enforcement action by any of the regulatory agencies."43
What litigation under the ATCA often seeks to do, in other words,
is to enforce legal norms of behavior above and beyond the enforced
law of the host country. It should come as no surprise that corporate
actors-the prime beneficiaries of lax local laws-have been among
the most vociferous opponents of broad ATCA jurisdiction, or that
some commentators have referred to ATCA litigation as "judicial
imperialism."4 4  Corporations have traditionally sought maximum
36. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
37. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), dismissed per
stipulation, 403 F.3d 708.
38. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 77 F. App'x 48 (2d Cir. 2003).
39. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2008).
40. See, e.g., Presbyterian, 582 F.3d 244, Doe, 473 F.3d 345; Abdullahi, 77 F.
App'x 48; Doe 1, 395 F.3d 932.
41. See Engobo Emeseh et al., Corporations, CSR and Self-Regulation: What
Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis? 11 GERMAN L.J. 230, 244 (2010).
42. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA'S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES
(1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1999/02/23/price-oil.
43. See Emeseh et al., supra note 41, at 245.
44. See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS,
AWAKENING THE MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 45 (2003); see
also Robert Bork, "Judicial Imperialism," WALL ST. J., June 17, 2003, at Al6.
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freedom to pursue profits, unencumbered by legal rules. This is
simply a result of corporate attempts to reduce the costs of production
in order to compete in the global market. As Herman Daly has put it:
"[c]osts to the firm are reduced by low pollution control standards,
low worker safety standards, low wages and standard of living for
workers, and, among others, low health care standards.'A5
At the same time, however, many major corporations have begun
to adopt voluntary codes of conduct under the rubric of "Corporate
Social Responsibility," or "CSR," in order to demonstrate a
commitment to values beyond profit. In fact, many of the same
corporations that are defendants in major ATCA cases alleging
human rights or other abuses are self-professed leaders in CSR.
Chevron, for example, the successor to Unocal after a merger, states
that "corporate responsibility is more than just an objective" but is
"central to everything we are and is embedded in everything we
do."46 Chevron's 2008 Corporate Responsibility Report details
numerous global initiatives to mitigate the environmental harm of its
projects and improve the lives of indigenous peoples. 47 In terms of
human rights, Chevron published a "Human Rights Statement" in
which it declared its support for human rights, acknowledges that
companies "can play a positive role" in contributing to human rights,
and pledges to "work actively to conduct our global operations in a
manner consistent with human rights principles applicable to
business."4 8 This includes recognizing and respecting the relevant
ideals expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." 4 9
ExxonMobil, too, has declared its support of human rights,
environmental protection, biodiversity, and standards of business
conduct that are "consistent with the spirit and intent of the United
45. See Herman E. Daly, Problems with Free Trade: Neoclassical and Steady-
State Perspectives, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND
POLICY 147-48 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993).
46. CHEVRON CORP., DEVELOPING PARTNERSHIPS: 2008 CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2009), available at
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/corporateresponsibility/2008/documents/Che
vron CR Report_2008.pdf.
47. Id.
48. See CHEVRON CORP., HUMAN RIGHTS STATEMENT,
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/chevronhumanrightsstatement.pdf (last
visited Apr. 12, 2010).
49. Id.
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Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights."50  Royal Dutch
Shell, sued for alleged human rights abuses in Nigeria, incorporates
human rights and social responsibility "as an integral part of its
corporate governance" including "the establishment of a Social
Responsibility Committee that reports directly to the board." 5
In addition to these commitments to substantive values such as
human rights and environmental protection, corporations at the heart
of ATCA litigation have made pledges to implement more procedural
CSR goals, such as promoting transparency in the way they conduct
business. Shell, for example, has become part of the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative and has supported the
Transparency International Business Principles on Countering
Bribery and the Principles for Countering Bribery. 52  In its 2008
Report on Revenue Transparency of Oil and Gas Companies,
Transparency International labeled Shell a "high" performer in terms
of revenue transparency (while ExxonMobil was a "low"
performer).53
Given these avowed corporate commitments to many of the very
norms at stake in ATCA litigation, one might ask why corporations
have fought so hard against recognition of these norms as legally
binding rules. "[W]hile there appears to be some consensus about the
concept, with companies themselves adopting voluntary codes
espousing their commitment to the core principles of CSR, there has,
however, been a strong resistance to a binding regulatory code for the
50. See ExxONMOBIL, 2008 CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT: HIGHLIGHTS 14
(2008), available at
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Files/communityccr08 highlights.pdf.
51. See Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act:
On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 635, 657 (2004).
52. See Article 13, Shell: Integrating Transparency and Anti-corruption
Throughout its Business in Nigeria, available at
http://www.articlel3.com/UNGC/Shell%20anti-corruption%20case%20study.pdf
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
53. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 2008 REPORT ON REVENUE
TRANSPARENCY OF OIL AND GAS COMPANIES 15 (2008), available at
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/31529/481007. Revenue
transparency refers to public disclosure of payments to governments, of financial
information pertaining to operations (such as production costs) and the existence of
anti-corruption programs. Id. at 10.
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activities of [multi-national corporations]." 54  Of course, the
corporate commitments may simply be for public relations purposes
alone. Some vociferous critics of CSR "charge that CSR is mere
'window-dressing,' or empty rhetoric that exists mainly for public
relations or marketing purposes, allowing companies to reap the
rewards and some business benefits of having a good CSR reputation
without keeping CSR promises or bearing the investment costs of
doing so."55
But even if CSR reflects sincerely held policies, corporations might
nonetheless be averse to facing damages risks whenever such policies
have been breached. This aversion may be heightened by the fact
that only corporations subject to personal jurisdiction in the United
States are subject to the ATCA.56 Thus, U.S.-based corporations may
fear a competitive disadvantage if they are made liable for actions
that companies with no U.S. presence, devoid of such legal strictures,
remain free to take. In addition, corporations may be wary of the
evolution of legally binding norms beyond their current commitments
to CSR-an evolution that would be largely outside their control.
Customary international law is not a static field. Today's legitimate
business decision may be tomorrow's human rights abuse.
Despite these fears, numerous scholars have called for far broader
federal court jurisdiction to try human rights and environmental
54. See Emeseh et al., supra note 41, at 237.
55. See Joe W. Pitts III, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and
Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 334, nn. 145-46 (2009).
56. Stephen Kass & Jean McCarroll, After 'Sosa': Claims Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act - Part 2, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 2004 at 5.
57. On the other hand, other nations have already incorporated various
Customary international law principles into their national law. Australia, for
example, recently passed laws allowing for criminal prosecutions for international
law violations such as genocide. See Joanna Kyriakakis, Australian Prosecution of
Corporations for International Crimes, 5. J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 809, 810 (2007).
58. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 102-367 at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86) (noting that the
ATCA "should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist
or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 702
cmt. a (1987) (noting that § 702's list of the customary international law of human
rights "is not necessarily complete, and is not closed").
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abuses.59 One of the key questions has been the extent to which
environmental claims are cognizable as violations of customary
international law. The consensus appears to be that environmental
claims are cognizable violations, although significant barriers
preclude many such claims. 60 The task of some scholars has been to
overcome such barriers by developing a notion of environmental
"rights" that may either fit into existing customary international law
norms or become developed into their own norms of universal
61
application.
Again, whether these scholars are correct as a matter of positive
law is not the focus of this paper. Instead, we take a more normative
view, using corporate CSR commitments as our starting point to ask
what sort of ATCA regime would foster improved CSR-and hence
improved environmental and human rights measures "on the ground"
in developing countries. As some scholars have put it, "one of the
challenges of using the concept of CSR in effectively promoting
corporate accountability so far has been the absence of a binding
regulatory framework." 62
While many corporations favor voluntary CSR commitments
alone, a legal regime with some binding rules would certainly be an
improvement. For one thing, legally binding rules might reveal
whether companies are serious about CSR or simply using it as a
public relations ploy. Even if companies are honestly committed to
CSR, legally binding rules may work to overcome the classic
collective action problem that arises when no individual corporation
59. See Richard Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545, 565-66 (2000).
60. See id. at 551 ("Although customary international law as applied through
ATCA is sufficiently broad to permit some suits for environmental harms, plaintiffs
face many obstacles."); Russell Unger, Note, Brandishing the Precautionary
Principle Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 638, 647
(2001) ("[D]istrict courts that have heard environmental claims under the ATCA
agree that the statute may apply to international environmental torts.").
61. See, e.g., Sarah M. Morris, The Intersection of Equal and Environmental
Protection: A New Direction for Environmental Alien Tort Claims After Sarei and
Sosa, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 275, 279 (2009); Neil A. Popovic, In Pursuit
of Environmental Human Rights: Commentary on the Draft Declaration of
Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv.
487, 515 (1996).
62. See Emeseh et al., supra note 41, at 237.
2010] 91
92 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
has an incentive to bind itself to a given norm if other corporations
are free to ignore it. Thus, legally binding rules may "push"
companies to adopt more robust commitments-and to add
commitments not previously adopted. This would have the effect,
according to some scholars, of "restor[ing] what is presently an
unequal bargaining power in which [multi-national corporations]
enjoy substantially more leverage over the environmental policies of
developing countries." 63
But the effects would likely go far beyond such "fairness"
rationales. A more robust ATCA would also "level the playing field"
so that corporations-at least those subject to U.S. jurisdiction-are
not forced to compete on the basis of lax human rights and
environmental protections. Even though, as noted supra,64 the ATCA
would not apply to all corporations-limited as it is by U.S. personal
jurisdiction-and thus would not preclude at least some corporations
from skirting the rules, U.S. personal jurisdiction is at least expansive
enough to capture many if not most of the largest multi-national
corporations in the natural resource extraction industries that lie at the
heart of the associated environmental problems in developing
nations.65 Even beyond the natural resource extraction industries,
"there are over 37,000 [multi-national corporations] worldwide,
almost all of which are based in or do business in the United States,
thus subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction of U.S. federal
courts." 66  Thus, legally binding rules in the U.S. would likely
promote economic efficiency by forcing corporations to lower costs
through efficiency improvements rather than through externalizing
63. See James Boeving, Half Full. . . Or Completely Empty?: Environmental
Alien Tort Claims Post Sosa v. Alvarex-Machain 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv.
109, 114 (2005).
64. See supra text accompanying note 57.
65. While many of the largest oil companies in the world (measured in terms of
production) are state-owned entities, the multi-nationals operating in developing
countries are almost all subject to U.S. jurisdiction. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004). Moreover, to the extent that firms subject to U.S.
jurisdiction might hesitate before investing in countries where human rights and
environmental abuses are unavoidable, this only provides an added incentive to
those countries to improve their human rights and environmental practices. Even if
companies not subject to U.S. jurisdiction do step in, the resulting financial benefit
to the host country will likely be lower due to reduced competition stemming from
the absence of firms that are subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
66. See Boeving, supra note 63, at 146.
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costs-such as environmental and human health costs-onto others
in the form of lax standards.67 Even among those companies with the
strongest voluntary CSR commitments, binding rules-and the
concomitant ability to conduct discovery-may lead to more
effective monitoring and enforcement of whether those commitments
are actually being carried out.
One potential criticism would be that efforts to strengthen legally
binding rules would simply push companies to funnel their local
operations through local subsidiaries-ones beyond the purview of
the U.S. courts-even if such local entities do not yet exist.
However, such fears are easy to overstate and are often not
empirically born-out. For example:
[C]ontrary to the predictions of academics and industry
observers, major oil companies have not systematically
contracted out the shipping of their oil [in response to
heightened levels of liability]. In fact, these companies
have moved in the opposite direction, now transporting
more crude oil in U.S. waters (both as a percentage and in
absolute terms) than they did before the heightened liability
imposed in the wake of the Exxon Valdez accident.68
Even if corporations do try to contract out their operations, U.S.
courts may "pierce the corporate veil" in appropriate situations.69
This is especially salient because, while local subsidiaries already
67. See Daly, supra note 45, at 156-57 ("Competition can reduce prices in two
ways: by increasing efficiency, or by lowering standards. The lower standards refer
to the failure to internalize social and environmental costs."). While this efficiency
rationale appears most salient in cases where location is easily changed (e.g.,
manufacturing), it also certainly plays a role in natural resource extraction, where
the location of the operation is tied to the location of the particular resource.
Unless the resource is scarce, firms often have a choice of locating in either high-
standards or low-standards jurisdictions. The oil extraction industry is a good
example. Oil-extraction leases in the United States often go unexploited, in part
because of the high cost of extraction relative to developing countries.
68. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Liability and Organizational Choice, 45 J. OF
LAW & EcoN. 91, 93 (2002).
69. See Fletcher v. Atex Inc., 68 F.3d 1451 (2d Cir. 1995).
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operate in many developing countries, the real decision-making is
70
often centralized in the parent company.
Thus, it seems undeniable that a more robust ATCA regime will
have some effect on multi-national corporations (i.e., that
corporations will not be able to contract around the law), and that,
from a CSR perspective, there would at least be some improvement if
there were at least marginal strengthening of legally binding norms.
A narrow regime-one that leads to the least amount of liability,
minimizing binding rules in favor of purely voluntary efforts-has its
obvious flaws. At the very least, minimizing liability minimizes the
financial incentive for corporations to adopt robust CSR
commitments, exacerbates environmental and human health
externalities, and minimizes the ability of private parties to police
corporate pledges.
There is, therefore, a strong case that at least some enhancement
and expansion of the legally binding norms under the ATCA would
foster improved CSR. 71 As a doctrinal matter, courts could either
incorporate procedural CSR considerations such as transparency-for
example, by stripping away any legal sanction gotten by means of
bribery, or by making bribery itself actionable if it causes harm-or
enforce substantive rules against major environmental harm. Courts
could enforce a basic right to life, which could be violated through
environmental harm just as it could be violated through direct action
such as murder.72 Courts could even go further, enshrining some
70. See Emeseh et al., supra note 41, at 235-236.
71. The relationship between CSR-improvement and rule-strengthening,
however, is likely not purely linear. As discussed more fully in Part IV. 1, infra, it
is likely not the case that the strongest legal rules (i.e., the set of legal rules that
would lead to the most corporate liability) would lead to the greatest improvement
in CSR. Under a maximally robust ATCA regime, corporations may view ATCA
liability simply as an unavoidable cost of doing business. If such cost is truly
unavoidable, corporations may reduce their precautions-believing they will suffer
adverse publicity no matter what they do-which may undermine the incentives to
adopt and meet their stated CSR goals.
72. See Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.),
1997 I.C.J. 91-92 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry)
("The protection of the environment is . . . a vital part of contemporary human
rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right
to health and the right to life itself."); see also Port Hope Environmental Group v.
Canada, Decision of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Communication
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limited right to a healthy environment based on international legal
principles that ban extreme environmental abuses such as
widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage.73 Other
principles such as the prohibition against genocide and the
prohibition against racial discrimination might also include
environmental elements. 74  Eventually, general international
environmental norms such as the precautionary principle or
sustainable development may develop a set of more concrete rules. 7 5
As one scholar has put it:
[I]nternational environmental law remains in its infancy
and lacks similar opportunities and motivating forces for
substantive development [as human rights law]. Human
rights law was not only fueled by the horrors of World War
I and II and had substantial time to develop internationally
before being substantially integrated into U.S. litigation,
but it was also free of the positivist limitations [discussed in
cases such as Sosa].76
Thus, while international environmental law, in its current
incarnation, exists largely as a set of nascent principles, there is much
room for it to grow and expand over time, if given the chance.
The lack of any clear statutory "plain meaning" or unambiguous
legislative history behind the ATCA means that efforts to expand the
"law of nations" to encompass evolving norms of international
CCPR/C/17/D/67/1980 (Oct. 27, 1982), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/fd1dce90bl957160cl256abe00
3484d9?Opendocument (recognizing environmental harm as a violation of the right
to life contained in Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, but dismissing petition for failure to exhaust domestic remedies). For a
normative view concerning states' duties to safeguard against environmental
hazards, see THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 310-11 (B.G. Ramcharan
ed., 1985).
73. See Herz, supra note 59, at 591-592 (2000).
74. Id. at 600-615.
75. See Russell Unger, Student Article, Brandishing the Precautionary
Principle Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL.L.J. 638 (2001)
(arguing that the precautionary principle can provide the basis of a claim under the
ATCA).
76. See Boeving, supra note 63, at 143.
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environmental law-and many of the procedural and substantive
elements of CSR-would not automatically be beyond the power of
the courts. The precise contours of how the ATCA should evolve in
this respect are beyond the scope of this paper-and will likely be the
subject of years of litigation, assuming courts allow it to happen.
Given the normative justifications for at least some marginal
expansion of the doctrine, we argue that courts ought to allow some
more robust set of environmental claims to be actionable under the
ATCA. In other words, they ought to allow the "law of nations"
under the ATCA to evolve with-and in turn shape-evolving norms
of international environmental law. This will only serve to
strengthen CSR commitments "on the ground" in developing
countries, especially among the natural resource extraction industries,
where CSR is inextricably bound up with environmental protection.7 7
There are, however, numerous obstacles to the evolution of the
ATCA in ways that would promote CSR. These obstacles-three of
which we explore in this paper-serve to undermine the extent to
which corporations may be held liable-or at least face the threat of
serious litigation-under the law. Before the ATCA may lead to
improved CSR-either by providing incentives to avoid international
law violations or by actually incorporating CSR tenets into
international law-these obstacles must be addressed.
III. OBSTACLE 1: AN AHISTORICAL AND INCOHERENT "LAW OF
NATIONS"
The first obstacle relates to what kinds of wrongdoing the ATCA
makes actionable. As described supra,7 8 the Supreme Court in Sosa
has held that wrongful acts under the ATCA are not limited to what
would have been a violation of the law of nations in the late
eighteenth century. 79 However it also warned courts to be cautious
when extending the reach of new claims.80 This has left the federal
courts hopelessly confused-in some cases allowing ATCA actions
77. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil, Environment Policy,
http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/aboutoperations-sbc-environ.aspx (last
visited Apr. 12, 2010).
78. See supra Part 11.2.
79. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004).
80. Id. at 725.
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to proceed on the basis of alleged wrongdoing that clearly would not
have been regarded as problematic by Congress in the late 1700s,
while in other cases rejecting such expansion. Most saliently for our
purposes, the question of whether substantive CSR principles such as
avoiding environmental harm-or procedural principles such as
transparency-may give rise to a "law of nations" violation remains
highly tenuous and uncertain. At least some of the difficulty with
extending the "law of nations" to CSR principles resides in the
Supreme Court's formulation of the "law of nations" as being bound
to the eighteenth century paradigms at the same time it is not
bound.8' Courts are left with the unenviable-and in some cases
impossible-task of deciding whether norms are "defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms." 82
It is not even clear what this formulation requires on its face. For
example, what exactly are the "features" of the eighteenth century
paradigms to which a court must compare the "features" of a modern
norm? The Supreme Court in Sosa announced that "federal courts
should not recognize private claims under federal common law for
violations of any international law norm with less definite content
and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when § 1350 was enacted." 83 There seem to be two issues
that arise from this formulation: one of acceptance and one of
content. The "universal acceptance" feature is akin to that described
by Blackstone, who wrote that the "law of nations" was considered to
be "a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by
universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world." 84 Of
course what constituted "universal acceptance" among "civilized"
nations was much narrower in the eighteenth century than it is today.
Yet today, as then, such universal acceptance is evidenced by treaties,
court decisions, custom, and the works of scholars.ss
At that level of generality, the requirement of universal acceptance
is fairly uncontroversial. However the Sosa Court, when applying
81. See id at 694.
82. Id. at 725.
83. See id at 732.
84. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66.
85. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900)).
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this requirement, essentially collapsed it into the second requirement:
that of definiteness or specificity. 86  In Sosa itself, the plaintiff,
Alvarez, had provided a survey of national constitutions and other
authorities for the proposition that "arbitrary" detention violated the
law of nations. 87 The Supreme Court dismissed these authorities by
stating that the "survey does show that many nations recognize a
norm against arbitrary detention, but that consensus is at a high level
of generality."88  While the Court noted that some extremely
prolonged arbitrary detentions might violate the law of nations, "it
may be harder to say which policies cross that line with the certainty
afforded by Blackstone's three common law offenses." 89 In sum, the
court held that "[w]hatever may be said for the broad principle
Alvarez advances, in the present, imperfect world, it expresses an
aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having the
specificity we require." 90
The general mode of analysis here is clear: until a modem norm
reaches some level of certainty or specificity "comparable" to the
eighteenth century paradigms, no cause of action will lie. What this
assumes, however, is that the law of nations in the eighteenth century
was itself specific and certain. This assumption is of course not
logically required. A mere requirement of "comparable" specificity
does not by itself imply anything about the degree of specificity of
the things being compared. Instead it derives from how the Supreme
Court formulated the inquiry, essentially conflating the need for
"specificity" with the need for a high degree of "certainty." The
Supreme Court's analysis clearly suggested that there was a high
degree of "certainty" afforded by Blackstone's description of the law
of nations, and that until a modern norm reached a similar level of
certainty, there could be no modem violation.9 1
This assumption, however, is misplaced. Blackstone himself
suggested that while the law of nations was in a general sense
immutable, it was as a practical matter neither fixed nor certain and
86. Id. at 725.
87. See id at 736 n.27.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 737.
90. Id. at 738.
91. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737-38.
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could be modified according to the necessities of the case. 92In
Blackstone's words, all criminal offenses, of which offenses against
the law of nations was part:
[S]hould be founded upon principles that are permanent,
uniform, and universal; and always conformable to the
dictates of truth and justice, the feelings of humanity, and
the indelible rights of mankind: though it sometimes
(provided there be no transgression of these eternal
boundaries) may be modified, narrowed, or enlarged,
according to the local or occasional necessities of the state
which it is meant to govern.93
In other words, the "features" of the eighteenth century paradigms
were meant to be universal, derived from natural law, but not
necessarily static over time or uniformly applied across nations. The
"law of nations" was thus part of the English common law tradition,
under which judges molded general principles to the particular
circumstances of the case.9 4 It was not reducible to something akin to
statutory codes. In the words of Justice Story in U.S. v. Smith, a case
cited by the Sosa majority, "[o]ffences, too, against the law of
nations, cannot, with any accuracy, be said to be completely
ascertained and defined in any public code recognised by the
common consent of nations."9 5
In other words, while the Supreme Court in Sosa acknowledged
that customary international law might evolve over time, it tried to
anchor that evolution in a false sense of the "certainty" of the "law of
nations" as it had been recognized under the eighteenth century
92. BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *3-4.
93. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
94. Blackstone himself is explicit that the "law of nations" was part of the
common law. BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *67 (noting "[i]n arbitrary states this
law [of nations], wherever it contradicts or is not provided for by the municipal law
of the country, is enforced by the royal power: but since in England no royal power
can introduce a new law, or suspend the execution of the old, therefore the law of
nations (wherever any questions arises which is properly the object of it's
jurisdiction) is here adopted in it's full extent by the common law, and is held to be
a part of the law of the land.").
95. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159 (1820) (holding that the
crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with reasonable certainty).
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natural law tradition. Contrary to the Court's assumption, the "law of
nations" was meant to be somewhat fluid and evolving from the very
beginning. As one scholar has pointed out:
The Founding Generation also expected the law of nations
to evolve through decisions by common-law courts as cases
were brought before them. The Continental Congress
recognized this when it recommended "to the several states
to erect a tribunal in each State, or to vest one already
existing with power to decide on offences against the law
of nations, not contained in the foregoing enumeration." 96
In the context of the ATCA, the hunt for certainty is no doubt
driven by the sheer multiplicity of possible sources of the "law of
nations," and a concern that "activist" judges might use the general
principles espoused in those sources to hold corporations liable for
actions that the corporations did not expect would lead to liability,
because those actions were never specifically enumerated as offenses.
In other words, the more specifically the offense must be defined, the
less power the judiciary has to "create" new offenses. The Supreme
Court acknowledged as much when it warned that the rule Alvarez
sought in that case would "create an action in federal court .. . for the
violation of any limit that the law of any country might place on the
authority of its own officers to arrest." 97 But apart from the specifics
of the claim before the Court, as a general matter the natural law
tradition that gave birth to the ATCA was one in which judges did
have power-not to "create" new offenses but, as Blackstone makes
clear, to "declare" how the offenses were to be applied in a given
case.98
There is of course an argument that making rulings pursuant to this
conception of natural law, as reflected in federal common law, has
been unavailable to the federal courts since Erie Railroad Co. v.
96. Dodge, supra note 30, at 242 (quoting 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789 1137 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912)). Moreover, "[n]ot only did
the members of the First Congress understand that the law of nations had evolved,
they expected that evolution to continue -- indeed, they specifically provided for
it." Id. at 238.
97. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737 (2004).
98. Dodge, supra note 30, at 242-43.
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Tompkins.99 The Supreme Court itself cautioned that "a more
expansive common law power" related to the ATCA "might not be"
consistent with Erie.100 At the same time, however, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that some common law power does remain in
the federal judiciary: "We think it would be unreasonable to assume
that the First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all
capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply because
the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the road to
modern realism." 01 Where precisely is the line between a common
law power consistent with Erie and a common law power
inconsistent with that case is left largely to the imagination.
Certainly Erie itself did not announce any principle by which courts
could develop some limited set of common law norms. 10 2 Courts are
left to grapple with the fact that the "law of nations" (and its modem
incarnation in customary international law) incontrovertibly belongs
to the common law tradition, 103 yet at the same time, courts are
cautioned that the common law development of the "law of nations"
remains beyond the purview of U.S. courts unless and until some
arbitrary threshold of "specificity" is crossed.104
The arbitrary nature of the specificity inquiry is only highlighted
by the essentially standard-less task it sets out for the courts. What
level of "specificity" is "comparable" to, for example, the offence of
piracy, which Blackstone claims "consists in committing those acts of
robbery and depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed
upon land, would have amounted to felony there"? 05  As an
analytical exercise, this question seems impossible to answer in any
remotely objective way. For example, some scholars have attempted
99. See Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What
Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
111, 122 (2004).
100. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n.19.
101. Id. at 730.
102. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding famously that
"[t]here is no federal general common law.").
103. Eric Engle, Alvarez-Machain v. United States and Alvarez-Machain v.
Sosa: The Brooding Omnipresence of Natural Law, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. &
DISPUTE RES. 149, 161 (2005) ("This is still true today: International customary law
is a part of the common law.").
104. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
105. BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *72.
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to delineate the salient features of piracy, setting forth the features
that seemed to animate the Sosa court.106 Along these lines, such
scholars argue that Sosa's historical test may put most if not all
modern human rights offenses beyond the purview of the courts. 0 7
Yet the Sosa court itself, at least rhetorically, would not go this far.10
What, then, does Sosa require? It appears that what the Sosa standard
accomplishes-akin to the "political question" and other doctrines
discussed infra-is to give courts a free-wheeling basis to deny
jurisdiction: to give courts virtually unchecked discretionary power to
decline to hear a case. Whether such discretionary powers are
consistent with the Constitution is not the focus of this paper. Our
point is simply that the fundamentally incoherent nature of the "law
of nations" inquiry-one where courts must anchor the "law of
nations" in certain eighteenth century paradigms while
simultaneously ignoring the way those paradigms were understood at
the time-has become a serious impediment to using the ATCA to
strengthen corporate environmental CSR.
This is not to say that judges should be free to adopt whatever
positive legal standards they wish, so long as it arguably comports
with some sweet-sounding general principle such as "precaution" or
"sustainable development." Between the specificity straightjacket
and the tempting promiscuity of judicial whim lies a middle-ground
that has long been occupied by courts: that of the gradual accretion of
norms and standards that develop through ever more-contextualized
interpretations to guide future courts. Such a task is certainly more
daunting in the international context, but it is by no means
impossible. Our claim in this paper is simply that such a process
should not be thwarted or made overly onerous by imposing
incoherent standards that allow courts to decline jurisdiction in
virtually any case.
Indeed, court decisions thus far have born-out the fear that the "law
of nations" test that was crystallized by the Sosa court may leave
precious little room for the sort of evolution contemplated by the
106. See Kontorovich, supra note 99, at 136-53.
107. Id.
108. 542 U.S. at 729 ("the judicial power should be exercised on the
understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus
open to a narrow class of international norms today.").
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drafters of the statute. 109 Certainly in the environmental context,
courts have declined jurisdiction in many cases by adopting a quite
narrow view of how specific the "law of nations" must be before an
action will lie. "10 In Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., for example,
which was "the first case to squarely address international
environmental law in the context of the ATS,""' the district court
held that the plaintiffs, suing over an international shipment of
hazardous waste under the Stockholm Principles, did not "set forth
any specific proscriptions, but rather refer[red] only in a general
sense to the responsibility of nations to insure that activities within
their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environment beyond
their borders."ll 2
Later cases have largely followed this pattern. In Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, the Fifth Circuit, in response to a claim of
environmental damage that included hollowing mountains, stripping
forests, and polluting rivers, held that the "sources of international
law cited by Beanal and the amici merely refer to a general sense of
environmental responsibility and state abstract rights and liberties
devoid of articulable or discernable standards and regulations to
identify practices that constitute international environmental abuses
or torts." 13  In Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, the Central District of
California, in response to claims of widespread environmental
damage, including deaths, from the defendant's mining operations,
held that despite numerous multinational agreements and treaties
describing a right to life and health, "the court cannot conclude that
the rights are sufficiently 'specific' that their alleged violation states a
claim under the ATCA, or that nations universally recognize they can
be violated by perpetrating environmental harm." 1l 4 The court also
held that the principle of sustainable development was insufficiently
specific to give rise to a legal obligation.115 While the court did hold
that plaintiffs could plead a violation of the United Nations
109. Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
110. Id. at 671.
111. See Boeving, supra note 63, at 118.
112. Amlon Metals, 775 F. Supp. at 671.
113. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999).
114. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1158, 1124-26 (C.D. Cal.
2002), aff'd in part, rev 'din part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).
115. Id. at 1160-61.
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Convention on the Law of the Sea,11 6 it then dismissed this claim
under the act of state doctrine-a dismissal that was reversed by a
Ninth Circuit panel,' whose opinion was then reheard en banc1 for
a resolution of the issue of whether exhaustion of local remedies
should be demanded."' 9 All in all, even in the Ninth Circuit, there
has hardly been any judicial attempt to recognize-let alone
develop-international environmental law under the ATCA.
Scholars have also taken note that the narrow way in which the
"law of nations" is defined will have a profound impact on
developing international environmental law under the ATCA.12 0
"Although Sosa did not altogether prohibit federal courts from
generating new federal law based on evolving international norms,
plaintiffs face a very heavy burden in trying to sue corporations under
the ATS for violations of environmental norms or treaties."' 2 1 This
"heavy burden"-combined with the doctrinal vagueness imposed by
Sosa-erects a significant barrier to encouraging greater CSR
through the ATCA.
IV. OBSTACLES 2 AND 3: UNSETTLED AIDING AND ABETTING AND
STATE ACTION RULES
A. The Doctrinal Debate
Apart from what counts as a violation of the "law of nations" under
Sosa, the federal courts have struggled with two related questions that
have a profound impact on CSR. The first question is: where the
bulk or core of the allegedly wrongful conduct was committed by a
private (usually corporate) actor, how much, if any, associated state
action is required for an action to proceed against the private actor?
116. Id. at 1161-62.
117. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d at 1197.
118. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).
119. See id
120. See, e.g., Pauline Abadie, Comment, A New Story of David and Goliath:
The Alien Tort Claims Act Gives Victims of Environmental Injustice in the
Developing World a Viable Claim Against Multinational Corporations, 34 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 745, 761-68 (2004).
121. James Donnelly-Saalfield, Student Article, Irreparable Harms: How the
Devastating Effects of Oil Extraction in Nigeria Have Not Been Remedied by
Nigerian Courts, the African Commission, or U.S. Courts, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.W.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 371, 397-98 (2009).
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The second question is: where the bulk or core of the allegedly
wrongful conduct was committed by a (foreign) state actor, how
much, if any, associated private corporate action is required for an
action to proceed against the private corporate actor? The first
question is typically subsumed under the label of a "state action"
requirement for an ATCA claim. The second question is typically
subsumed under the question of whether and when the ATCA allows
for aiding and abetting liability.
Figures One and Two map two possible visions of the different
alternatives in terms of the possible legal regimes and their effect in
promoting corporate social responsibility. At the far left side of both
figures is a regime where the ATCA is understood to not allow any
corporate liability, and hence would have no bearing on CSR. In
both visions, the least CSR-friendly legal regimes (no corporate
liability, no aiding and abetting liability) are the same; the
differences, as discussed below, relate to the ordering of the two,
most CSR-friendly legal regimes. High threshold is used as a rough
or crude way of expressing a legal threshold that would exclude some
but not all potential plaintiffs, whereas a low threshold would allow
most, if not all, potential plaintiffs to pursue claims.
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The position that the ATCA should not apply at all to
corporations-the far left position on both Figures One and Two-
builds on a Sosa-like notion that corporations generally have not been
the subject of international law. In terms of actual judicial decisions,
it is Judge Korman's dissent in Khulumani v. Barclay International
Bank that most clearly adopts this view:
There is a significant basis for distinguishing between
personal and corporate liability. Where the private actor is
an individual, he is held liable for acts which he has
committed and for which he bears moral responsibility. On
the other hand, "legal entities, as legal abstractions can
neither think nor act as human beings, and what is legally
ascribed to them is the resulting harm produced by
individual conduct performed in the name or for the benefit
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of those participating in them or sharing in their
benefits."' 2 2
However, even Judge Korman acknowledged that post-apartheid
international law (and law generally) extended responsibility to
corporations as well as individuals, and rejected the distinction as
largely artificial and antiquated for purposes of the imposition of
liability.123  Judge Korman's primary point appears to be that
corporate liability should not be retroactively applied to the era of
apartheid's founding, even though it may be applied now. In his
words, "the issue here is not whether policy considerations favor (or
disfavor) corporate responsibility for violations of international
law. ... Instead, it involves a determination of what the law was
during the relevant period." 24
Sosa specifically left open the question of corporate liability under
the ATCA,125 but the argument has not been embraced by any court,
and for good reason. There simply is no principled basis for
distinguishing between private non-corporate actors and private
corporate actors for purposes of the ATCA. Civil liability-and that
is what the ATCA about-is uncontroversially applied to corporate
actors by the U.S. courts on much the same terms it is applied to non-
corporate actors.126 Moreover, it is clear that, from its enactment, the
ATCA was intended to apply and was applied to some private actors
such as pirates.127 It is of course true that corporations act through
individuals, but these individuals often are not subject to the personal
jurisdiction of American courts and/or lack the resources to
compensate victims;' 2 8 thus, limiting ATCA suits to ones against the
individual corporate employees or officers responsible for corporate
wrongs in effect would render the ATCA a statute that creates rights
122. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'1 Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 321 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Korman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
123. See generally id. at 292-337.
124. See id at 325 (citation omitted).
125. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
126. Audrey Koecher, Note, Corporate Accountability for Environmental Human
Rights Abuse in Developing Nations: Making the Case for Punitive Damages under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 17 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 151, 156 (2007).
127. For a good historical discussion of the ATCA that makes this point at
length, see Lovejoy, supra note 17.
128. Id. at 246-47.
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to redress but no effective means of achieving redress. Such a
statutory reading would be directly contrary to the maxim that
legislatures should be assumed to intend that statutory language have
real meaning. Indeed, U.S. law treats corporations like other private
persons even where doing so seems to entail an extreme
anthropomorphization of the corporate "person," as in Citizens
United v. FEC, where the United States Supreme Court conferred on
corporations as great, or perhaps greater, rights to speech and
political association via the making of campaign contributions as
private individuals. 129
The second box from the left in both Figures One and Two reflects
an arguably more cogent view than the one that there is no corporate
liability under the ATCA-that is, the view that there is no aiding
and abetting liability for any private actor, corporate or otherwise,
under the statute. In practice, this view would exclude liability for
the large number of cases where there is substantial involvement of
some kind by state or quasi-state actors or non-corporate private
actors in the alleged wrongdoing. No Court of Appeals has squarely
embraced the no-aiding-and-abetting-liability position, but several
prominent academics, relying in substantial part on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, have done so. 130 In Central Bank, a divided Court
held that the federal securities laws do not implicitly create private
aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud, even though there is
criminal aiding and abetting liability.' 3 1  Jack Goldsmith, Curtis
Bradley, and David Moore have argued that the Central Bank plus
Sosa framework does and should operate to exclude liability for
aiding and abetting primary violations of the ATCA.1 32 They argue
that:
As an initial matter, it is important to recall that the text of
the ATS refers to torts "committed" in violation of
international law. There is no suggestion in this language
129. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Conun'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
130. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law & the
Continuing Relevance ofErie, 120 HARv. L. REv 869, 926-27 (2007).
131. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 180-
85 (1994).
132. Bradley et al., supra note 130.
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of third-party liability for those who facilitate the
commission of such torts.... The analysis in Sosa suggests
a number of reasons why aiding and abetting liability
should not be read into the ATS. The Court repeatedly
emphasized that, consistent with the limited nature of the
ATS and the separation of powers constraints on the federal
courts, only a "modest number" of claims could be brought
under the ATS without further congressional authorization.
The Court further counseled the lower courts to exercise
"great caution" in recognizing new claims. And the Court
emphasized that "innovative" interpretations should be left
to Congress. As we noted earlier, however, allowing
corporate aiding and abetting liability would significantly
expand ATS litigation. It would also require courts to
exercise significant policy judgment normally reserved to
the legislature, such as fashioning the precise standards for
what constitutes aiding and abetting.
For similar reasons, the Supreme Court declined to imply
aiding and abetting liability in civil cases brought under the
securities fraud statute. In Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, the Court reasoned that allowing
aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud would
expand litigation in a way that would implicate policy
tradeoffs best resolved by Congress. The Court also
reasoned that Congress's authorization of aiding and
abetting liability in the criminal context did not suggest a
general acceptance of that type of liability in the civil
context. Finally, the Court noted the substantial
uncertainties associated with the standard for aiding and
abetting. 133
As we argue above, the Sosa case and hence Sosa framework is
essentially incoherent.' 34 Sosa may teach us that there should not be
"too many" ATCA claims allowed, but it is possible to translate that
vague teaching into the position that generally aiding and abetting
claims should be allowed if the primary violations are well-founded
133. Id. at 926-27 (citations omitted).
134. See supra Part III.
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in international law or the position that there should be a reasonably
high threshold for what constitutes aiding and abetting under the
ATCA or the position that Clark, Goldsmith, and Moore endorse 35
that there should be no aiding and abetting liability under the ATCA.
With respect to Central Bank, a key point is that, normatively, the
decision may well be "wrong": it was a 5-4 decision that overruled a
large body of lower court precedent and went against the prevailing
recommendations of expert regulators and that has been subject to
trenchant criticisms by commentators, particularly in the wake of
Enron and now Lehman Brothers and other failures of financial
institutions that arguably were aided and abetted by key private
actors.136 Moreover, the very brevity of the ATCA-the fact that it is
a single sentence-suggests that Congress intended the courts to
work out the shape of ATCA liability in a common law fashion,
rather than relying on direct legislative direction (as we argue
supra).137 That, plus a historical context in which aiding and abetting
liability generally was recognized and specifically discussed with
respect to the ATCA, 138 -distinguish Central Bank, even assuming
Central Bank was correctly decided. As Judge Hall explained in his
concurrence in Khulumani:
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court held that the Securities
Acts of 1933 and 1934 did not encompass aiding and
abetting liability. Noting that the Acts provided for some
forms of "indirect" liability, the Supreme Court reasoned
that "Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting
liability when it chose to do so." This same reasoning
cannot apply to the ATCA, whose textual brevity and
dearth of legislative history leave us with inconclusive
evidence of Congress's intent to include or exclude aiding
and abetting liability. It would appear, however, that the
135. Bradley et al., supra note 130 at 926-27.
136. See Celia R. Taylor, Reconsidering Central Bank of Denver after Enron and
Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 Mo. L. REv. 367 (2006); George Cohen et al., Have US
Regulators Been Soft on Banks Over Structured Products? Yes, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
July 2006, at 13, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1523712.
137. See supra Part III.
138. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'1 Bank., Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 288 n.5 (2d Cir.
2007) (Hall, J., concurring).
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Founding Generation nevertheless understood the ATCA
encompassed aiding and abetting liability. For example, in
Attorney General Bradford's 1795 opinion, Breach of
Neutrality, he opined that the ATCA allowed civil suits for
damages for those who had "taken part" in violating
international law. In fact, Bradford's opinion specifically
covered those American citizens who "voluntarily joined,
conducted, aided and abetted" the French fleet in their
attack on a British settlement. Attorney General Bradford
furthermore referred to an April 1793 Proclamation issued
by George Washington which declared that "all those who
should render themselves liable to punishment under the
laws of nations, by committing, aiding or abetting
hostilities" against the merchants of foreign nations at
peace with the United States would not receive the
protection of the United States. Cases from that era,
moreover, indicate that secondary liability was recognized
as an established part of the federal common law. 139
Moving from left to right, the next box on both Figures One and
Two reflects what might be thought of as a near no-win-ever position
for plaintiffs seeking to sue corporations under the ATCA. There is a
kind of "catch-22" inherent in any legal regime that sets a high or
demanding threshold for meeting both the state action and aiding and
abetting requirements. If the bar is set high for state action, and that
high threshold is met in a particular case by implication, then, by
implication, private actors will have had a relatively modest or
attenuated role in the allegedly wrongful conduct. Thus, it will be
between difficult and impossible for plaintiffs to meet a high or
demanding threshold for aiding and abetting liability. Conversely, if
the bar is set high for aiding and abetting then, by implication, private
actors will have had a very substantial and perhaps central role in the
allegedly wrongful conduct. Thus, it will be very difficult for a
plaintiff to meet a high or demanding threshold for state action.
Where the private corporate and state actors operate absolutely in
tandem, sharing equally in the wrongful conduct, this catch-22 would
be avoided; indeed, in such a case, both the private and state actors
139. Id. (Hall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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could be considered primary violators of the ATCA, so aiding and
abetting as a legal category would be irrelevant. But such cases
presumably are and will be rare, if there are any such cases at all.
When we move to the two boxes farthest to the right side of
Figures One and Two, there are differences in ordering. Figure One
offers what we would take to be the most intuitive ordering-one in
which the "best" or "friendliest" position from a CSR perspective
would be one in which there is both a low threshold for aiding and
abetting and for state action, as the barriers to suits against
corporations would be minimized. Figure Two reflects what we
believe to be the correct ordering, if not the immediately intuitive
one-that is, one in which the most CSR-effective regime marries a
high threshold for aiding and abetting liability with a low threshold
for meeting the state action requirement. In the sections below, we
explain why a low threshold for the state action requirement is
always desirable, and why it is at least arguable that,
counterintuitively, a high threshold for aiding and abetting liability
best advances the goals of CSR.
B. The Case for a Purposive Action Requirement for Aiding and
Abetting Liability
The courts have articulated at least two distinct versions of the
aiding and abetting requirement for ATCA liability. In the first
version, which we call the "knowledge test," a corporate party may
be deemed to have aided and abetted a violation of the ATCA if it
knowingly provided substantial assistance to the violator. 140 In the
second version, which we call the purpose test, a corporate party may
be deemed to have aided and abetted a violation of the ATCA if it
provided substantial assistance to the violator with the intent or
purpose of furthering the committing of the violation itself.14 1 In the
framework of Figures One and Two, the knowledge test is the low
threshold for aiding and abetting liability, and the purpose test is the
high threshold for aiding and abetting liability.
140. See, e.g., Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1356 (N.D. Ga.
2002).
141. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman, 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d
Cir. 2008).
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The knowledge test has been formulated as "[i] knowing [ii]
encouragement [iii] that facilitated the substantive violation."l 4 2 The
purpose test has been formulated as providing that:
[A] defendant may be held liable under international law
for aiding and abetting the violation of that law by another
when the defendant (1) provides practical assistance to the
principal which has a substantial effect on the perpetration
of the crime, and (2) does so with the purpose of facilitating
the commission of that crime.143
While it would certainly be semantically plausible to conflate the
tests and argue that someone who does something knowing it will
help a certain action takes places thereby acts with the purpose of
facilitating the action, the knowledge/purpose dichotomy captures a
real, intuitive difference: the difference between a corporation that
does not specifically intend to assist, for example, mass poisoning or
torture as such, but knows that it is financially assisting a state actor
that may in fact decide to commit the mass poisoning or torture, and
the corporation that specifically intends-specifically wants-the
state actor to use the assistance to commit mass poisoning or torture.
Various court opinions suggest that, as a doctrinal matter, the
choice between the knowledge and purpose tests depends on the
choice of the source of law to be used for the determination of what
constitutes the threshold for aiding and abetting liability. Two
notable opinions in this regard are Judge Hall's and Judge
Katzmann's concurrences in Khulumani.144  The crux of the
consolidated lawsuits at issue in Khulumani was that fifty U.S. and
foreign corporations had aided and abetted atrocities committed by
the South African government during apartheid (from 1948 until
1991) by providing oil, technology and capital to the South African
government, which then used the resources in part to further its
policies of oppression and persecution of the African majority. 145
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the
142. Id. at 258 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 259.
144. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264-292.
145. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 545 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
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aiding and abetting claims, but the two judges voting for the reversal
differed as to the source of law the judge believed to be the source of
the applicable aiding and abetting standard.14 6  Judge Katzmann
argued that international law provides the basis for any aiding and
abetting standards, and that international law dictated a purpose test,
not a knowledge test. 147 By contrast, Judge Hall argued that domestic
law-in effect, federal common law-determined the standard for
aiding and abetting liability and that, under section 876 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the knowledge test was the correct
tests for the aiding and abetting of alleged ATCA violations. 148
Similarly, when the Second Circuit subsequently established the
purpose test as the definitive test within the Circuit, the Court tied its
decision to its choice of international law as the appropriate source
for the standard for the aiding and abetting of ATCA violations.149
It would not seem to make much sense, however, to tie the choice
of aiding and abetting standard to the choice of the source of law.
For one thing, both the federal common law and international law-
and especially customary international law-are amorphous enough
that one probably could find a range of standards dictated by either of
them; ask any law student or lawyer and they will surely tell you that
they cannot describe the content of either with any specificity.
Moreover, to make matters even more confusing, one could plausibly
argue that international law is a legitimate source for a court to look
to in making a decision under federal common law.
From a normative perspective, one might want to choose between
the knowledge and the purpose test by asking which test would better
advance CSR goals. Assuming that is the relevant normative
framework (as we do here), it might at first seem that the knowledge
test would be better than the purpose test. Under a knowledge test,
more corporations in more settings would be exposed to possible
liability (and the disclosures attendant litigation) than would be the
case under the more demanding purpose test. Even in a knowledge
test regime, corporations of course could go out of their way not to
146. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260.
147. Id. at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 287-89 (Hall, J., concurring).
149. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman, 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir.
2008) ("[A]pplying international law, we hold that the mens rea standard for aiding
and abetting liability for ATS actions is purpose rather than knowledge alone.").
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know what state and other actors do, but it might be difficult for them
to deny knowledge, and courts might well treat intentional refusal to
learn of certain activities by the relevant state or non-corporate actor
as equivalent to knowledge. In effect, a knowledge test means that a
corporation cannot stay out of court by simply saying it was just
doing business and did not want, for example, government agents to
dump waste, burn villages, or kill environmental activists but simply
wanted to peacefully proceed with its oil field development.
The knowledge test, however, may be less effective in promoting
CSR precisely because it would make ATCA suits too easy to file
and pursue. It would be too potent. A wide range of corporations
doing business in certain countries where human rights and
environmental abuses are commonplace would be exposed to
possible suit. Indeed, in many cases, corporations may feel that there
would be no way they could do business in certain countries without
exposing themselves to ATCA claims. As a result, they may feel that
there is no advantage in taking actions to avoid ATCA liability-
actions such as encouraging state and non-state actors with whom
they work to engage in more humane and/or environmentally sound
practices than they otherwise might choose.
The large number of suits that a knowledge test might well make
possible also may have the effect of dampening the strength of the
signal an ATCA suit can send to the constituencies upon which the
CSR movement relies for its impact-namely shareholders, investors
in social responsibility funds, and consumers. Where the standard for
aiding and abetting liability is so broad that it does not exclude
corporations that (relatively speaking) try to discourage abusive
behavior by affiliated state or other actors and throws such companies
into the same cauldron of shame as companies that happily accept or
actively encourage the most horrendous behavior, then the fact of an
ATCA suit and litigation might not communicate that much
information to the relevant CSR constituencies about any given
corporation in particular. The impact of ATCA litigation would thus
be lessened, and in turn, the ex ante incentives of corporations to take
measures to avoid possible ATCA litigation and liability would be
further reduced.
The facts in the Second Circuit case of Presbyterian Church
illustrate this point well. In that case, the core allegations were that
an oil company aided and abetted human rights abuses by the
government of Sudan, including abuses associated with the forced
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clearing of the population near areas of oil exploration and
development.15 0 The corporation emphasized that it had repeatedly
urged the Sudanese military not to engage in human rights abuses.s15
As the Second Circuit suggested, the corporation's efforts actually
worsened their legal position under a knowledge test while aiding
their legal position under a purpose test:
The reports that plaintiffs rely upon to prove knowledge
also show that Greater Nile security personnel and GNPOC
workers were upset by the Government's actions and
possible attacks on civilians. For example, several reports
address the company's efforts to relive the plight of
internally displaced persons, which included stockpiling
tons of relief supplies and distributing food, water,
medicine, and mosquito nets. 152
There is of course a risk that under a purpose test regime,
corporations will try to ATCA-proof themselves by making minimal
efforts to protest or mitigate wrongdoing by state actors or non-state
actors with whom they are affiliated in a foreign country. But
minimal efforts may be better than no efforts-which could well be
the product of a knowledge regime-and plaintiffs could allege and
seek to prove that the protest or mitigation efforts were simply a
sham and that the corporation intended to aid the wrongdoing. It
might well be hard for plaintiffs to make such a showing as an
evidentiary matter, but as long as they had some basis for alleging the
corporation acted with the requisite (bad) purpose, the plaintiffs
would at least have the opportunity to seek discovery and possibly
bring the corporation's true motivations to light.
The fmal problem with the knowledge test relates to an important
constituency-the federal courts themselves. The federal courts have
a range of ways of avoiding ATCA suits that have nothing to do with
the standard for an actionable violation under Sosa, the standard for
aiding and abetting, or the state action requirement: these include
invocation of the political question doctrine, a stringent application of
personal jurisdiction requirements, and perhaps, above all, the
150. Id. at 250.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 264.
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flexible doctrine of forum non conveniens. 153  A test that makes
aiding and abetting cases too easy to plead adequately under the
ATCA may produce an indiscriminate backlash on the part of the
courts, in which the courts simply shut the doors to ATCA litigation
using the range of tools available to them to do so.
C. The Case for No State Action Requirement or a Low-
Threshold State Action Requirement
The aiding and abetting threshold for ATCA liability and the state
action requirement, while clearly related, are not quite mirror images
of each other. First, the courts sometimes do not require any state
action at all in order to find private parties liable under the ATCA.15 4
Second, even within non-CSR normative considerations, there is a
very good case that state action never should be a pre-condition for
the imposition of liability. Finally, from a CSR perspective, the state
action requirement that would be most effective is no requirement at
all, or at least a low threshold requirement (i.e., that the foreign state
actors in question merely knew or constructively should be charged
with knowledge of the allegedly wrongful conduct committed by the
private corporate defendant). For these reasons, we embrace the
position adopted by the Second Circuit in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.,
which seems to be that where a private corporate actor violates an
international norm through a corporate activity (such as medical
153. See Jeffrey E. Baldwin, International Human Rights Plaintiffs and the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 749 (2007). There is,
of course, the danger that plaintiffs will simply allege the defendant corporation
acted purposefully even when there is no direct or even strong indirect evidence
known to them that this is true or even where they suspect or know that not to be
true. And the filing of a lawsuit, by itself, can be costly for a defendant corporation.
But the federal district courts, particularly in light of the recent tightening of
pleading standards by the United States Supreme Court, should be able to manage
the dismissal of these cases.
154. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 255 ("[C]laims for
genocide and war crimes against individuals [can] proceed without state action."
(citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995))); Romero v.
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1316 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Under the Alien Tort
Statute, state actors are the main objects of the law of nations, but individuals may
be liable, under the law of nations, for some conduct, such as war crimes,
regardless of whether they acted under color of law of a foreign nation.").
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testing without the permission of the test subjects), either no state
action or only minimal state action is required for the ATCA suit to
proceed to proceed against the private corporate actor.
It is not straightforward to explain what the current state of federal
law is regarding the state action requirement for ATCA claims.
There seems to be reasonably broad consensus that certain kinds of
conduct trigger ATCA liability even in the absence of any significant
state action or at least any significant, knowing or purposeful state
action. Thus, even the Chamber of Commerce, a strong critic of
ATCA litigation, seems to recognize that the ATCA applies to purely
private action with respect to "war crimes, genocide, the slave trade,
airplane hijacking, and piracy."l 5 6  The Second Circuit in Pfizer,
drawing upon Section 1983's expansive "under of color of law" test
and jurisprudence, does not seem to require that the state actor knew
what was wrongful and hence illegal about the private corporation's
conduct before it happened.' 5 7  By contrast, "the Eleventh Circuit
155. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
156. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 6, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009)
(No. 09-34) (citing Bigio v. Coca-Cola, 239 F.3d 440, 447-48 (2d Cir. 2000)).
157. This is the reading urged by Pfizer and supporting amici in seeking
certiorari. See Brief for the Petitioner, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc, 562 F.3d 163 (2d
Cir. 2009) (No. 09-34); Brief for the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 156 at 9-
10. However, the Second Circuit's discussion of the requirement for state action, if
any, was not entirely clear as to what mens rea for the state actor, if any, is
required:
The Appellants have alleged that the Nigerian government was involved in
all stages of the Kano test and participated in the conduct that violated
international law. They allege that the Nigerian government provided a
letter of request to the FDA to authorize the export of Trovan, arranged for
Pfizer's accommodations in Kano, and facilitated the nonconsensual
testing in Nigeria's IDH in Kano. Despite overcrowding due to concurrent
epidemics, the Nigerian government extended the exclusive use of two
hospital wards to Pfizer, providing Pfizer with control over scarce public
resources and the use of the hospital's staff and facilities to conduct the
Kano test, to the exclusion of MSF. The unlawful conduct is alleged to
have occurred in a Nigerian facility with the assistance of the Nigerian
government and government officials and/or employees from the IDH and
Aminu Kano Teaching Hospital. Pfizer's research team in Kano was
comprised of three American physicians, Dr. Abdulhami (a physician in
the Aminu Kano Teaching Hospital), and three other Nigerian doctors.
[VOL. XXI
THREE OBSTACLES TO PROMOTION
requires that the foreign government know of the specific wrongful
conduct alleged to violate international law, and the Ninth Circuit
requires a state plan or policy to commit that conduct." 58
There is no clear normative case for requiring knowing or
intentional state assistance or a state policy in support of private
wrongdoing in order for liability to be imposed on private
corporations. It may well be true that, historically, international law
has mostly been applied to states, but it has not always so applied
and, moreover, international law has and presumably should
evolve.159  Moreover, a number of the powerful normative
considerations that argue in favor of the Sosa position of caution in
extending the scope of jurisdiction of the ATCA are largely
inapplicable where almost all the relevant conduct was that of a
The American and Nigerian members of Pfizer's team allegedly jointly
administered the Kano test.
Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 188.
158. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 U.S. 163 (2d
Cir 2009) (No. 09-34). As the Chamber of Commerce explained in its brief:
In Pfizer, the Second Circuit brought petitioner within the ATS's ambit on
the basis of Nigeria's alleged assistance in helping set up the experiments,
with no requirement that plaintiff allege that the government knew of or
participated in the specific wrongful acts - medical trials without proper
consent. See Pet. App. 50a-52a. Aldana, by contrast, required much more.
It rejected a state action link based on allegations that the state tolerated
and failed to prevent torture, and required plaintiffs to allege that state
officials "knew of and purposefully turned a blind eye" to the specific acts
that formed the basis of the international law claim. Aldana, 416 F.3d at
1248. Aldana allowed only one claim to proceed, and then only because
plaintiffs alleged that a state actor (the mayor) had actually participated in
the alleged acts of torture that violated international law - a different and
far more demanding state action standard than the one applied by the
majority opinion below. Similarly, in Abagninin v. Amvac Chemical
Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 741-42 (9th Cir. 2008), the court required, as a
prerequisite to a crimes against humanity claim by a worker in Ivory Coast
against a chemical corporation, that the state knowingly participate in the
corporation's wrongful acts. It also noted that plaintiff had not alleged a
state plan or policy to commit the wrongful acts.
Brief for Chamber of Commerce supra note 156, at 9-10.
159. Such evolution is also consistent with the notion that the ATCA covers the
"law of nations" (not simply international law), which grew out of a natural
law/common law tradition. See supra Part III and note 156.
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private corporation.160 The more a state actor is involved in a given
case, and the more it is it involved as a purposeful actor, the more a
court's exercise of jurisdiction would seem to raise possibly difficult
questions of international comity and deference to the Executive as
the branch of government with principal responsibility over foreign
affairs. Conversely, the less a state actor is involved in a given case,
and the less its involvement, if any, was purposeful vis-A-vis the
alleged wrongdoing, the less a court's exercise of jurisdiction would
seem to raise possibly difficult questions of international comity and
deference to the Executive as the branch of government with
principal responsibility over foreign affairs.
From the vantage of CSR, no state action or a minimal state action
requirement would also seem to be normatively correct. A
corporation that undertakes wrongdoing without any participation of
state actors or passive participation at best would seem to be more
culpable than a corporation that has a modest and grudging role in
committing wrongs in concert with state actors who intentionally,
insistently undertake the wrongdoing. Certainly the key CSR
stakeholders of consumers, shareholders and socially-responsible
funds would be just as interested-and, one would think, more
interested-in learning about the former situations than the latter, and
ATCA litigation would be one means by which they could become
informed. Indeed, it is precisely where there is no or minimal state
involvement that the choice made by corporate actors-the very thing
the CSR "movement" seeks to influence-might make a difference in
terms of whether abuses to human rights and the environment happen
or not. Finally, unlike a minimal aiding and abetting standard, a
minimal state action standard is very unlikely to result in an
onslaught of cases (nor result in the downside of such an onslaught,
as discussed supra),161 because, in most of the developing countries
at issue, private corporate actors usually cannot engage in the kinds
of conduct the ATCA is likely to make actionable without at least
some knowing cooperation and involvement of state actors. State
action is now-and likely to continue to be-less often a possible
160. Supra Part IV.3. See generally Mark W. Wilson, Why Private Remedies for
Environmental Torts under the Alien Tort Statute Should Not Be Constrained by
the Judicially Created Doctrines of Jus Cogens and Exhaustion, 39 ENVTL. L. 451
(2009).
161. See supra Part IV.2.
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issue of contest in ATCA litigation, simply because the scenario of
state actors being deeply involved in alleged wrongdoing is more
common than the scenario where state actors are minimally involved,
if at all. 162
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, we conclude that the ATCA could be a powerful tool to
promote corporate CSR, especially in developing countries where
local legal restraints are weak. But despite the good normative
reasons why the ATCA should be used in this way, serious obstacles
remain. The Supreme Court's ahistorical and incoherent formulation
of the "law of nations" fails to promote the development of the
ATCA in ways that would cover even serious environmental harm.
Also, the federal courts' confused jurisprudence concerning aiding
and abetting and state action creates too many loopholes through
which egregious corporate behavior may slip unpunished. In order to
overcome these obstacles, we argue that the "law of nations" should
not be read so restrictively, that a "purposive" aiding and abetting
standard should be adopted, and that the requirement of state action
be minimized or eliminated altogether. These steps would go a long
way toward promoting the very CSR considerations that many
corporations involved in ATCA litigation have already espoused.163
162. This appears to be part of the argument of the Respondents in opposition to
the grant of certiorari in Abdullahi. See Brief in Opposition at 20-21, Abdullahai v.
Pfizer, Inc., 562 U.S. 163 (2d Cir 2009) (No. 09-34).
163. We are not asserting that the ATCA is necessarily the only or even the best
means of promoting adherence to CSR by multinational corporations operating in
countries with undeveloped or unreliable systems of tort compensation. It may
well be that an international treaty among nations with the creation of reporting and
compensation requirements could be better tailored to the objectives of encouraging
responsible investment and due consideration to the wide range of differences
among countries and populations. But there are no such treaties on the horizon and
the development of ATCA liability for environmental harms, even if only in the
most catastrophic cases, is more likely to encourage multinational corporations to
support the development of treaty law than would the absence of any realistic threat
of ATCA liability.
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